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Passing as Modernism
Pamela L. Caughie
In 1990 Barbara Johnson gave a series of lectures at the 
University of Chicago on psychoanalysis and African American 
literature. In those days many feminists were exploring the 
question of whether or how post-structuralist theories could be 
applied to multicultural literatures. At the time I was an unten-
ured assistant professor heavily inﬂuenced by Johnson’s style of 
deconstruction, so you can imagine my discomfort when I learned 
that the second lecture in that series, entitled “No Passing,” was 
to be a reading of Nella Larsen’s Passing, the very novel I was 
then writing about in an essay that would turn out to be the incep-
tion of Passing and Pedagogy: The Dynamics of Responsibility 
(1999). So at the reception following the ﬁrst lecture, I cornered 
Johnson and anxiously spewed out all the ideas I was exploring 
in that essay, seeking to convince her (and possibly myself) that 
I hadn’t taken my ideas from the lecture that I hadn’t yet heard. 
I talked about the nature of our authority, as white feminist 
critics trained in a Eurocentric theoretical and literary tradition, 
in the African American literature classroom where, as Patricia 
Hill Collins and Diana Fuss remind us, knowledge derived from 
experience is given more credibility than knowledge acquired 
through training. How does racial difference inﬂect the process 
of transference that you have helped us to see as central to the 
pedagogical relation, I asked her? What does it mean to learn 
from the one presumed not to know, from (so to speak) an un-
reliable narrator? In response to these questions that I found so 
urgent and complicated, Johnson replied with her characteristic 
composure: All I know is, she said, I don’t want to be another 
Carl Van Vechten.1
Johnson’s response came back to me several years later when 
I was researching and teaching at the Newberry Library in 
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386 Chicago. The seminar, entitled “Mapping Identities,” focused on modernist writers, 
artists, and scholars who traveled to and wrote from locales other than their countries 
or regions of origin. We looked at the motivations for their travels and at the ways they 
represented other cultural groups, to better understand that miscegenated history 
we now call modernism. In our unit on the southwest we read about John Collier, a 
promoter and defender of American Indian culture who later became the head of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs at a time when the ofﬁcial U.S. policy toward native peoples 
was one of assimilation. I discovered that John Collier had stayed with Mabel Dodge 
and Tony Luhan in Taos around the time D. H. Lawrence was there. Yet Lawrence, who 
would write his own idealized vision of Indians in his 1924 novella, “The Woman Who 
Rode Away,” was disgusted by Collier’s enthusiasm for Native American culture and 
allegedly said to a friend, more or less: All I know is I don’t want to be John Collier.
What does such a statement, a peculiar kind of xenophobia, tell us about modern-
ism and its contemporary critique? What is the common structure in these responses? 
Of course, the very need to deny similarity, to assert “I’m not that,” arises from the 
fear of resemblance, as Johnson has argued in her essays on Hurston—the recogni-
tion that in the eyes of others, even in one’s own eyes, perhaps, one may be precisely 
that, or at least that the difference one insists on may be so subtle as to be negligible. 
While many cultural critics are concerned with what my colleague Chris Castiglia calls 
“psychic blackface,” that is, the phenomenon of whites wanting to be and identifying 
with blacks or Indians, my concern is with the corollary phenomenon of whites not 
wanting to be identiﬁed with other whites engaged in similar efforts to identify across 
racial lines, as in “I don’t want to be Carl Van Vechten.” It is a phenomenon that I have 
explored in terms of “passing.” 
Passing has once again become a hot topic in contemporary popular culture and a 
major trope for our critical and professional activity. One thinks of Danzy Senna’s Cau-
casia (1998); Philip Roth’s The Human Stain (2000) and the 2003 ﬁlm version directed 
by Robert Benton; and in literary and cultural criticism, Gayle Wald’s Crossing the Line: 
Racial Passing in Twentieth-Century U.S. Literature and Culture (2000), Kathleen 
Pfeiffer’s Race Passing and American Individualism (2003), and Brooke Kroeger’s 
Passing: When People Can’t Be Who They Are (2003), to name only a few examples. In 
Passing and Pedagogy I explore this concept largely in terms of contemporary culture 
and criticism. Yet the echo of Johnson’s words in Lawrence’s disavowal—I don’t want 
to be John Collier—has led me to consider more carefully the emergence of passing, 
as I have reﬁgured it, in modernism. In that Newberry seminar, I was struck by how 
the difference between the artistic and the touristic use of other cultures was often 
lost upon students as it was upon many modernists themselves. For example, in the 
1920s, artists, writers, art patrons, anthropologists, and entrepreneurs came together in 
the southwest to promote “a romantic mix of archeology, art, tourism, and politics,” as 
Desley Deacon writes in her biography, Elsie Clews Parsons: Inventing Modern Life.2 
While they sought ways to incorporate native art and culture into Western lives without 
“patronizing, appropriating, or destroying” it, such a project was necessarily fraught with 
ambiguity: cultural preservation depended on Western tourism, and spiritual renewal 
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387meant “going native.”3 In the Newberry seminar, we read works by and about Elsie 
Clews Parsons and D. H. Lawrence in Taos; Sergei Eisenstein and Langston Hughes 
in Mexico; Claude McKay and Josephine Baker in France; and Zora Neale Hurston 
and Melville Herskovitz in the Caribbean. We studied the music of John Alden Car-
penter, the photography of Edward Weston, the drawings of Miguel Covarrubias, and 
the dance of Katherine Dunham. And the more we read, the more important and the 
more difﬁcult it became to distinguish those who were appropriately self-aware in their 
representations of others from those who were shamelessly appropriative. I came to 
see passing and the anxieties it arouses, as well as the border crossings (both literal and 
imaginative) that at once enable and express it, as the peculiar identiﬁcation at the heart 
of modernism—and not just in the sense that the androgyne and the mulatto served 
as cultural icons of the modernist generation. Rather, I would argue that the ﬂuidity 
of identity boundaries that we have come to identify with postmodernity—especially 
a postmodern notion of subjectivity as constructed, discursive, and ﬂuid—has as much 
or more to do with the historical conditions in which modernist art was produced as 
with the textual theories of post-structuralism. But ﬁrst I need to explain the various 
ways the term “passing” has been used and how I have reﬁgured that concept. 
Passing Reﬁgured
Let me begin with some illustrated examples.4 Passing as white is, of course, how 
modernists would have understood the term. But even in this, its ﬁrst cultural sense, 
passing is far more complicated than the notion of wearing a mask or of assuming a 
fraudulent identity would suggest. In his New Yorker essay, “White Like Me,” on the 
life and writings of Anatole Broyard, Henry Louis Gates, Jr. reconceives passing as a 
modernist phenomenon. Gates describes Broyard (ﬁg. 1), a well-known book reviewer 
for the New York Times, who was born a Negro in 1920 and later passed as white, as a 
man obsessed with modern culture and modernist literature. “The thematic elements 
of passing,” Gates writes, “fragmentation, alienation, liminality, self-fashioning—echo 
the great themes of modernism.”5 Passing in this sense—passing as white—is often 
seen as fraudulence or betrayal, as a sin against authenticity. Yet authenticity, Gates 
says, is “among the founding lies of the modern age,” a Romantic fallacy rejected by 
modernists.6 Extrapolating from Gates’s reading, we could argue that it was not so much 
that Broyard lived a lie as that he refused to live a conventional ﬁction. 
Passing in the modernist period was more than a literary theme, and as a social prac-
tice, far more complicated than its common deﬁnition would suggest. Passing came to 
signify the dynamics of identity and identiﬁcation in the modernist period—the social, 
cultural, technological, and psychological processes by which a subject comes to under-
stand his or her identity in relation to others. Passing—actual and imaginary, conscious 
and unconscious—at once produced profound shifts in thinking about the boundaries 
of identity and aroused ambivalence about those shifting, unstable borders.
Yet the notion of passing as fraudulence and deception remains dominant today, 
despite the modernist erosion of such binary thinking. Madeleine Albright (ﬁg. 2) was 
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Fig. 1. Anatole Broyard. Photo taken in Central Park, 1960s. Photo courtesy of Jerry 
Bauer. 
▲
exposed, so to speak, in 1997 for passing as a Catholic all her life. The question that 
preoccupied newspaper editorials and talk shows then was, what did she know of her 
Jewish ancestry and when did she know it? As if identity were an on-off switch, as if 
one woke up one day and said, “Today I am a Jew.” To appropriate one’s Jewish identity 
in that way would be to act without the cultural memory that would place that identity 
in a social history, spiritual tradition, and material existence. To say “I am a Jew” in 
this sense would be, as Alain Finkielkraut says, “an error of grammatical attribution 
of person.”7 In his autobiographical The Imaginary Jew, a work of intellectual history, 
Finkielkraut offers a scathing critique of his earlier political identiﬁcation as a leftist, 
for his politics led him to exploit his Jewish identity without the cultural memory that 
would root that identity in the concrete daily lives and the social and spiritual traditions 
of Jews. He was, in essence, passing, not in the usual sense of disguising his Jewishness, 
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but in the sense of using it, “unveiling” himself to others and “making a spectacle of 
[his] difference” (IJ, 171, 172). Finkielkraut’s term for this kind of ﬁctive identity is 
“imaginary Jew.” Like my use of “passing,” the term is an effort to name what has never 
been considered a category of identity. 
In her 1990 lecture at Chicago, “No Passing,” Barbara Johnson argued that passing 
is acting as if one could determine one’s subject position, as if one were an autonomous 
subject without heritage, family, or history. To reject passing in this sense, as Finkeilkraut 
did, is to confront and to struggle with one’s own historically constituted identity. In 
reclaiming a cultural memory and a historical past in his confrontation with Judaism, 
however, Finkeilkraut insists that he has not become more authentically Jewish. “The 
word ‘Jew,’” he writes, “is no longer a mirror in which I seek my self-portrait, but 
where I look for everything I’m not, everything I’ll never be able to glimpse by taking 
myself as a point of reference” (IJ, 179). One can imagine that Albright’s struggle with 
her religious and racial identity was, like Finkeilkraut’s, a moral journey that was not 
▲
Fig. 2. Madeline Albright. images.tvnz.co.nz/.../ madeleine_albright150.jpg
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390 so much a process of ﬁnding one’s self (“I am a Jew”) but an “undoing of the self” (IJ, 
176), an acceptance of the ethical obligation to struggle with identity as a process, not 
a given, and to accept responsibility for one’s particular forms of passing.
Two highly publicized trials in the 1920s, one in the U.S., the other in Britain, not only 
epitomize the public’s fascination with passing at that time, but evidence its emerging 
sense of identity as something one acquires rather than something one is. In 1924 Alice 
Jones (ﬁg. 3), daughter of a working-class couple, married Leonard “Kip” Rhinelander, 
son of one of New York’s leading families. Their different class status was enough to 
make the marriage headline material, as Earl Lewis and Heidi Ardizzone note in their 
book on the Rhinelander trial, Love on Trial; however, the disclosure a month after the 
wedding that Alice was “colored” prompted a media frenzy. The public trial in 1925 
over Leonard’s annulment suit was covered by newspapers across the country and in 
England and was the ﬁrst occasion of the use of photojournalism. An actress was hired 
and photographed reenacting the partial disrobing of Alice Jones before a sequestered 
judge and jury in an effort to provide “ocular evidence” of her race to determine what 
Leonard could have been expected to know and when.8 Yet the legal arguments sup-
posedly meant to determine Alice’s race ended up exposing the slipperiness of racial 
categories, even as both sides employed racial as well as gender stereotypes to make 
their case. The prosecution’s star witness, for example, was Al Jolson, the most famous 
blackface performer of the day. “The image of Al Jolson next to Alice and George Jones 
[her father],” write Lewis and Ardizzone, “drew into sharper focus the impossibly thin 
line separating blacks and whites in America, and the anxiety that closeness produced.”9 
In the end, the trial threw into strong relief popular beliefs about racial distinctions. 
As an editorial in the Messenger put it, when it comes to race as well as sex, “deception 
is the rule.”10 The cover of the Messenger, with its masthead, “The World’s Greatest 
Negro Journal,” for that month (December 1925) illustrates just how ambiguous race 
may be, and how unreliable “ocular evidence” can be (ﬁg. 4).
Four years later in Britain, Colonel Victor Barker, alias Valerie Arkell-Smith (ﬁg. 
5), was tried for perjury in 1929 for passing as man. In this case, the identity of her sex 
was not in dispute, nor was her sexuality the legal issue, even though she was married 
to a woman. The perjury trial centered on what we now call gender identity, raising 
questions about how to classify this anomalous woman. The spectacle of the closely 
cropped Arkell-Smith, forced to wear a dress throughout the trial, testifying that she 
had always felt herself to be a man before a male judge wearing a gown and a wig of 
curls, must have struck witnesses even then as perverse—and this at a time when the 
androgynous fashions of the day and the “New Woman” were arousing anxiety over what 
were thought to be clear-cut sex differences. As Laura Doan points out in her article 
on this trial, “Passing Fashions,” from which this photo is taken, “The whole point of 
twenties fashion was that no one knew for sure” one’s gender or sexual preference.11 
“No age,” Virginia Woolf wrote in the same year as the trial, “can ever have been as 
stridently sex-conscious as our own.”12 
The public exposure of the Zuni la’mana, or “men-women,” in anthropological 
accounts of the time, such as Elsie Clews Parsons’s 1916 essay, “The Zuni La’mana,” 
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Fig. 3. Alice Jones, 1924. From Earl 
Lewis and Heidi Adrizzone, Love on Trial 
(Norton, 2001). Photo courtesy of Bett-
man/Corbis.
Fig. 4. Cover photo from the 
Messenger, December 1925. Mrs. 
Credit, Philadelphia PA. Photo 
courtesy of The Newberry Li-
brary, Chicago.
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called into question the binary system of gender classiﬁcation that Arkell-Smith’s case 
also challenged. What struck many anthropologists in the 1920s as a sexual perversion, 
the la’mana—called “the Berdache” by colonialists who saw them as homosexual trans-
vestites or male prostitutes and called “two-spirit people” in many American Indian 
cultures today—undergo a ceremony that marks their passage into a new identity and 
a third gender. That is, they literally pass over. In a later essay, Parsons writes: “This 
native theory of the institution of the man-woman is a curious commentary, is it not, 
on that thorough-going belief in the intrinsic difference between the sexes which is 
so tightly held to in our own culture.”13 How tightly is revealed in a 1925 report by 
the Indian Rights Association that I found at the Newberry. In an effort to discredit 
the views of anthropologist F.W. Hodge, the report mocks the “gullability . . . of some 
scientists” for accepting We-Wha (ﬁg. 6) as a woman. “‘We-Wha’ is probably the best 
joke the American Indian ever played on men and women of trained minds . . . . whose 
training was such that they would be expected to know the difference between a man 
and a woman.”14 Given that a la’mana is buried in women’s attire on the male side of 
the cemetery, that difference may not be so clear-cut. 
▲
Fig. 5. Daily Mail, 7 March 1929:  Valerie Akrell-Smith, alias Colonel 
Victor Barker. By permission of the British Library.
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The trials and the Zuni ritual raise the question of whether identity is ever anything 
other than a performance. In presenting an image of oneself to others, “there is ﬁnally 
no getting away from the stage,” writes Finkeilkraut (IJ, 172). The point is brought 
home in this famous image of Josephine Baker (ﬁg. 7). In this musical production, The 
Chocolate Dandies (1924), Baker is passing as black insofar as blackface performance 
brings out the performativity rather than the authenticity of blackness. As Eric Lott 
writes, blackface performance stages racial categories; it produces blackness and white-
ness as racial identities to be assumed, making a spectacle out of racial difference and 
keeping blackness “on display and up for grabs.”15 
Often racial impersonation is motivated by legal or social strictures. Susan Kohner 
played Sarah Jane (ﬁg. 8) in Douglas Sirk’s 1959 Imitation of Life, a remake (or rather, 
makeover) of John Stahl’s 1934 ﬁlm based on Fanny Hurst’s novel. Although Fredi 
Washington, an African American actress, played the original role of Peola in the 1934 
production, in Sirk’s version, a white Jewish woman passes as a black woman passing as 
a white non-Jewish woman, because in 1959, a real black woman could not kiss a white 
man, as the revised script called for. The shock of the ﬁlm depended on the viewer’s 
willing suspension of disbelief that Kohner is black.
Thirty years later another Jewish woman impersonates a black woman. Although 
Sandra Bernhard (ﬁg. 9) does not don blackface in Without You I’m Nothing (1990), 
her campy performances create an effect closely related to minstrelsy. Bernhard im-
personating Nina Simone is likely to be deemed more culpable than Susan Kohner 
playing Sarah Jane, if only because Bernhard plays herself playing Nina Simone and 
ﬂaunts our racialized fantasies of identiﬁcation. What disturbs many critics of her ﬁlm, 
▲
Fig. 6. We-Wha (a.k.a. Wewa) Weaving. Edward E. Ayer Collection. Photo courtesy of The Newberry Library, 
Chicago.
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I suggest elsewhere, is that Bernhard’s self-conscious performance brings to mind our 
racial fantasies and our own forms of passing, as critics of popular culture, and more-
over, that she makes no effort to disavow them; she does not insist, “I’m not Madonna.” 
Bernhard does not fall back on a notion of her “real” subject position (as a lesbian or a 
Jew) to save herself from exposure or to defend her forays across racial boundaries.16 
Thus Bernhard refuses to sanction the belief that the desires and motivations fostering 
crossover performances can be controlled, as if one could engage in border crossing 
without running the risk of being accused of passing. 
Anna Deavere Smith passing as a Jewish man in Fires in the Mirror (ﬁg. 10) does not 
arouse as much anger as Bernhard, perhaps because Smith is impersonating everyday 
people, not cultural icons, and speaking their words. Still, her act of speaking for and 
as another implicates her in a common structure of passing, and her theory of Ameri-
can identity as identity in motion, always being negotiated, works against a notion of 
authenticity as much as does Bernhard’s camp. On stage it takes Smith about twenty 
seconds to pass as someone else: identity in motion is accelerated indeed.
▲
Fig. 7. Josephine Baker in blackface, 1924. Billy Rose Theatre Collection, 
The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations.
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Fig. 8. Susan Kohner as Sarah Jane. From Imitation of Life: Douglas Sirk, Director. Rutgers Films in Print, v. 16, 
1991. Photo by permission of Howard Mandelbaum, Photofest, Inc.
Fig. 9. Sandra Bernhard, Without You I’m Nothing. M.C.E.G. Productions, Inc, 1990. Reproduced from Pamela 
L. Caughie, Passing and Pedagogy (U of Illinois, 1999). Still credit: Loyola University Center for Instructional 
Design (LUCID).
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Tourism and travel produce their own forms of passing that are not explicit per-
formances. Sergei Eisenstein in Mexico (ﬁg. 11) might well have aroused Lawrence’s 
contempt by dressing native. Donning the attire of the region, like surrounding oneself 
with the cultural artifacts of native peoples, is often considered a form of passing, reﬁg-
uring the self by appropriating the cultural markers of another’s identity. One can hear 
Lawrence’s contemputuous voice: “put on a sombrero and knot a red kerchief round 
your neck . . . that is the New Mexico known to most Americans”—or in this case, the 
Mexico known to a Russian.17 Yet in his autobiography, Immoral Memories, Eisenstein 
expresses what Mexico meant to him in terms very like Lawrence’s on New Mexico. 
Eisenstein writes: “During my encounter with Mexico, it seemed to me to be, in all the 
variety of its contradictions, a sort of outward projection of all those individual lines 
and features which I carried and carry within me like a tangle of complexes.”18 
D. H. Lawrence was not one to dress native; his writings express contempt for those 
who did and for the tourist’s superﬁcial interest in native culture. “I cannot cluster at 
the drum anymore,”19 he wrote. And yet in his paintings, Lawrence portrays himself 
▲
Fig. 10. Anna Deavere Smith. Reproduced from Fires in the Mirror (Anchor 
Books, 1993). Photo courtesy of Adger W. Cowans.
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in a kind of blackface (ﬁg. 12), racializing masculinity, as he does in “The Woman 
Who Rode Away.” In this story the Chilchui of Mexico, insistently described as black, 
represent a primal maleness, and the American woman (who seeks self-transformation 
among the Indians) personiﬁes the white race that must be sacriﬁced to restore both 
spiritual and sexual harmony to the materialist West. Lawrence may not have identi-
ﬁed with natives the way Collier and Eisenstein did; indeed, he portrayed himself as 
an outsider to both whites and natives in New Mexico. But his paintings and ﬁction 
tell another story.
▲
Fig. 11. Sergei Eisenstein. Reproduced from Inga Karetnikova, Mexico According to Eisen-
stein (U of New Mexico Press, 1991). Photo courtesy of Lilly Library, Indiana University, 
Bloomington, IN.
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Granted, my examples push to the limit the notion of “passing,” and may seem to 
beg the question of the difference between any two instances. Surely, we think, there is 
a world of difference between Mabel Dodge marrying a Pueblo Indian and promoting 
Indian art; Elsie Clews Parsons adopting an Indian identity following her hair washing 
ceremony with the Hopi; and Mary Austin’s adoption of an Indian persona in her poetry. 
Surely Barbara Johnson’s essays on African American literature differ markedly from 
Carl Van Vechten’s Nigger Heaven, a novel which struck many, including Lawrence, 
as cashing in on the fad of the New Negro. In his 1926 review of Nigger Heaven and 
Walter White’s Flight, Lawrence writes that in reading these novels, one is disappointed 
▲
Fig. 12. D. H. Lawrence, “Fight with an Amazon” from The Paintings of D. H. Lawrence (London: 
The Mandrake Press, 1929). Courtesy of The Newberry Library, Chicago.
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to discover that the “Negroid soul … is an Edison gramophone … which is what the 
white man’s soul is, just the same” (“NM,” 362). For Lawrence, such “passing” across 
racial boundaries risks homogenizing the differences (actual and imagined) necessary 
to identiﬁcation. Yet Wallace Thurman, in his Messenger review of Nigger Heaven, 
found the novel to “pulsate” with the “genuine rhythms peculiar to Harlem.” Johnson 
may ﬁguratively position herself as black (an argument Elizabeth Abel has made in 
“Black Writing, White Reading”), but Van Vechten, says Thurman, may literally be 
mistaken “in the provinces as another Negro writer.”20 Miguel Covarrubias’s portrait 
of Van Vechten, entitled “A Prediction” (ﬁg. 13), could be seen to bear out the truth 
of both Thurman’s and Lawrence’s reviews.
▲
Fig. 13. Miguel Covarrubias, “Carl van Vechten: A Prediction.” Beinecke Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University. Reproduced from Bruce Kellner, 
Carl Van Vechten and the Irreverent Decade (University of Oklahoma Press, 1968). 
Photo courtesy of Bruce Kellner.
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precisely one point I make in my use of the term is that one cannot always tell the dif-
ference, nor, I argue, should we even want to make responsibility—whether artistic, 
moral, or political—depend on reﬁning the boundaries between appropriate crossings 
and appropriative ones. Indeed, it is the belief that we must draw the line between 
forms of passing that leads even those as smart and self-aware as Barbara Johnson to 
the anxiety reﬂected in her remark, “I don’t want to be another Carl Van Vechten.” 
Modernist writers, from Lawrence in his review of Nigger Heaven and Walter White’s 
Flight, to Heba Jannath in her essay on passing in Nancy Cunard’s Negro Anthology, 
to Parsons in her essay on the Zuni la’mana, have portrayed passing as betraying con-
ventional markers of racial or sexual difference, undermining the belief in intrinsic 
differences. Contemporary critics have also reconceived the social practice of pass-
ing, presenting it neither as fraudulence nor selling out but as a performative act and 
a strategic intervention that exposes systems of racial or sexual oppression. For both 
modernist and contemporary writers, passing undermines the reliability of the binary 
logic of identity (you are either black or white), thereby exposing, in Harryette Mullen’s 
words, “the actual ﬂuidity of ostensibly rigid racial [or sexual] boundaries.”21 
When it comes to its metaphoric use, however—when passing is applied to a situation 
in which one impersonates or represents another, speaking as or for a class of people—it 
is still commonly conceived, as it was by Lawrence, in terms of inauthenticity and ap-
propriation. The very disruption of rigid racial, sexual, or ethnic boundaries brought 
about by passing as a social practice leads to the fear that the notion of ﬂuid boundaries 
can, if taken too far, suggest that anyone can change one’s racial or sexual identiﬁcation 
at will, can, in effect, become someone else. As one letter to the editor on Madeleine 
Albright’s case put it, this is a free country and she can be whatever she wants to be.
Well, no she can not, but that is the worry: namely, that “category crisis,” the term 
by which Majorie Garber designates “a borderline that becomes permeable, that per-
mits of border crossings from one (apparently distinct) category to another,” will lead 
to what Phillip Brian Harper calls “category collapse.”22 That is, destabilizing identity 
categories risks the loss of all distinctions. The fear that crisis means collapse leads 
to a search for guarantees of motivation and import: I am not John Collier. Passing, 
in my conceptualization of the term, requires learning to live and act without such 
guarantees.
Marianna Torgovnick, whose 1990 book, Gone Primitive, exposes forms of passing 
in modernist culture, makes an argument that has become common in critiques of 
psychic blackface: “When we say ‘caveat nobody’ and revel in the postmodern melange 
of us and them, we are in danger of abjuring responsibilities every bit as grave as those 
evaded when the early colonists decided that land could be taken from colonized peoples 
. . . to make way for Western modernization.”23 I question two assumptions here: one, 
that the melange of us and them, the loss of deﬁnitional distinctions, is characteristic 
of postmodernism, and two, that the breakdown of identity boundaries is analogous to 
a raid upon another’s territory. This moral argument conceives identities as bounded, 
like territories, so that it is easy to determine who is guilty and who is victimized in 
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the responsibility we abjure through the territorial metaphor, is to understand identity 
as dynamic, more like a wave, a transfer of energy from point to point, than like the 
transfer of land. I prefer “passing” to the more common term “performativity” to de-
scribe this concept of identity because passing brings out the historical emergence of 
this concept in actual social practices (not linguistic or philosophical theories) within 
a speciﬁc historical context. That context is late modernity. 
The “Technological Substance” of Modernism and Identity
Important as social passing and passing fashions were in upsetting rigid boundaries 
and making those border ﬁgures, the androgyne and the mulatto, the cultural icons of a 
generation, another development in the early twentieth century had a more profound 
effect on passing: technology. Through the swift dissemination of cultural products (e.g., 
music, literature, fashion) worldwide by means of new technologies and the forces of 
mass culture, the borders separating nations and geographic regions, like those sepa-
rating races and genders, became permeable and insecure. The “masthead” of British 
Vogue in the 1920s—”VOGUE KNOWS NO FRONTIERS”—captures the modernist 
sensibility of unlimited boundary crossing inspired by new modes of transportation, 
such as the motor car and the airplane, and new means of communication, such as the 
gramophone and the radio.24 Such border crossing, facilitated by new technologies 
and fueled by an increasingly touristic and consumer culture in the interwar period, 
had a profound effect on the imagining of national and personal identity in modernist 
cultural productions.
New technologies enabled border crossing by making travel more accessible and 
affordable. It may strike us as amusing today that Lawrence wrote in a letter to Mabel 
Dodge Luhan that he would be arriving in San Francisco on such and such a day and 
since San Francisco was almost to Taos, he would soon be there. Of course, when one 
travels to Taos as Lawrence did by way of Ceylon, Australia, and Cuba, San Francisco 
seems fairly close. Still, the point is that by the early 1920s the world had become a 
much smaller place. 
In 1924 Lawrence’s access to Taos was facilitated by the increasingly affordable 
technology of the automobile. Road maps, a relatively new form of cartography in 
the late 1920s and 1930s, displayed images of women at the wheel (ﬁg. 14), symbol-
izing their liberation by this new technology (though by the 1940s women were safely 
returned to the passenger seat). In Woolf’s 1928 novel, Orlando enters the twentieth 
century with the magic of modern technology. At the sound of the clock striking the 
11th of October 1928, Orlando runs downstairs, jumps into her motor car, presses the 
self-starter, and is off to Marshall & Snelgrove’s, where she is “shot smoothly upwards” 
in the lift: “The very fabric of life now, she thought as she rose, is magic.”25 Not only 
was travel facilitated, but new technologies also produced new sensory experiences 
(such as those Orlando undergoes while motoring), which in turn led to new concepts 
of national and personal identity. As Michele Pridmore-Brown puts it in her article 
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on Woolf and technology, “Britain’s island insularity offers no protection in the air 
age”—that is, the age of airplanes and air waves.26 
New modes of transportation may have made the world “small and known,” as 
Lawrence says in his essay “New Mexico”: “There is no mystery left, we’ve been there, 
we’ve seen it, we know all about it. We’ve done the globe and the globe is done.” But 
that, Lawrence concedes, is a superﬁcial view. “Underneath,” he writes, “is everything 
we don’t know and are afraid of knowing” (“NM,” 141). In his travels in Ceylon and the 
southwest, Lawrence underwent a new sensory or sensual experience, “an experience 
deep down in the senses,” he writes, that is the “ancient race-self” (“NM,” 144.) For 
Lawrence that experience of a primitive identity depends on an unmediated relation 
to the other; the superﬁcial knowledge of others is for him a celluloid image proffered 
by the ﬁlmmakers. On the other hand, in her 1926 essay, “The Cinema,” Woolf lo-
cates the primitive experience not against but precisely in the new technology of the 
cinema: “People say that the savage no longer exists in us, that we are at the fag-end 
of civilization, that everything has been said already . . . But these philosophers have 
presumably forgotten the movies. They have never seen the savages of the twentieth-
century watching the pictures.”27 
The relation between new technologies, especially new recording devices such as 
cameras and gramophones, and primitivism is elaborated by Michael Taussig in his 
fascinating study Mimesis and Alterity. Taussig’s important contribution to modernist 
studies is his argument that recording machines, “whose job it is to reproduce likeness,” 
reveal “the intimate relationship between primitivism and the new theories of the 
▲
Fig. 14. “Detroit Road Map,” 1932. The Rand McNally Collection. Courtesy of The Newberry Library, 
Chicago.
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in Taussig’s words, “a tremor in cultural identity . . . in the security of Being itself” 
(MAA, 226). The experience of “voice divorced from sight” that Gillian Beer writes 
was made possible by radio and phonographs, the “unconscious optics” that Walter 
Benjamin says was introduced by the camera and revealed new structural formations 
of the subject, contributed to that “tremor in cultural identity,” what Theodor Adorno 
calls the “shudder of mimesis” (MAA, 211).29
In his essay “On the Mimetic Faculty,” Benjamin writes that “the gift of seeing 
resemblances is nothing other than a rudiment of the powerful compulsion in former 
times to become and behave like something else”—that is, to pass.30 That compulsion, 
which Benjamin associates with the primitive, manifests itself in the modernist period 
in various and fascinating ways, from tourists dressing in native attire, to new hair prod-
ucts promising the Valentino or Josephine Baker look, to Western writers looking to 
other cultures for the spiritual values that supposedly eluded their own technological 
society. The increased mobility and newly permeable borders of the early-twentieth 
century—made possible by new sound and visual technologies as much as by new 
modes of transportation—made people aware (perhaps for the ﬁrst time, at least on 
such a large scale) of the production of cultural identity, the way identity is mediated 
through various cultural forms. And this awareness distinguishes the performativity of 
modernism from the compulsion Benjamin identiﬁes as mimetic. Technology has been 
both an incentive to and a medium for passing in this special sense. As Michael North 
points out in Reading 1922, new forms of mechanical reproduction in the modernist 
era—such as photojournalism, broadcasting, and ﬁlm—differed from earlier forms 
in that the sound and visual images they produced appeared to be real while at the 
same time new technologies made the fact of mediation all the more apparent.31 The 
relation between technology and passing is implied by a line in Bonnie Kime Scott’s 
essay in Virginia Woolf in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. Writing about the jazz 
records T.S. Eliot brought into Woolf’s parlor, Scott remarks: “Victrolas crossed the 
color line.”32 Scott’s phrase explicitly invokes the social practice of passing and raised 
for me the question of how mechanical reproduction fostered passing, that desire to 
become something else.33
The Americanization of popular culture throughout the world, Taussig notes, “owes 
an enormous amount to the music reproduced by the phonograph” (MAA, 198), and 
that musical export in the 1920s was predominantly jazz. An essay on jazz in Cunard’s 
Negro, translated from the French by Samuel Beckett, draws an analogy between 
jazz and the surrealist movement as new modes of sensory experience. For “the intel-
ligent and cultivated youth of Europe,” writes Robert Gofﬁn, “hot jazz is almost the 
only form of music that has any meaning for their disrupted generation.”34 In his 1929 
novel, Banjo, set in postwar Marseille, Claude McKay signals the importance of the 
gramophone in the chapter “Everybody Doing It”: 
Two gentlemen in golf clothes, very English-looking and smoking cigarettes, were spending 
a long time before a shop window, apparently absorbed in a plaster-of-Paris advertisement 
of a little dog with its muzzle to a funnel. It was a reproduction of the popular American 
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legend: La Voix de son Maitre.35 
My point is that we might more accurately refer to the Aframericanization of popular 
culture by new technologies.36 In his essay, “Jazz at Home,” published in Alain Locke’s 
The New Negro, J. A. Rogers remarks that jazz “ranks with the movie and the dollar 
as the foremost exponent of modern Americanism.”37 The New Negro craze fueled 
by the popularity of jazz was propelled across the Atlantic by the talking machine, the 
wireless, and the cinema. Jazz, Rogers says, “bears all the marks of a nerve-strung, 
strident, mechanized civilization,”38 signifying modernity in what Taussig calls the 
“technological substance” of its identity, but also in the way it excited passing. Iden-
tity in the modernist era, I argue, was not just mechanized, it was racialized by new 
technologies. That is to say, the age of mechanical reproduction introduced certain 
cultural shifts that made it increasingly necessary to think about race as a component 
of identity formation, inspiring new fantasies and new possibilities of identity, whether 
Locke’s New Negro or Toomer’s blue man.
I use passing to name those practices by which we try to refuse the identities that 
have been historically offered to us, and that continue to structure our responses even 
as we seek to disavow them (often through that peculiar form of xenophobia I identi-
ﬁed earlier). If for modernists, writing was a matter of effacing—not expressing—the 
self, today self-disclosure seems far more pressing. Getting personal, breaking silence, 
coming out—these are the moral imperatives of our postmodern age. Yet as Sissela 
Bok writes in her book on the ethics of concealment, the metaphor of the closet with 
its language of private space and inside/outside boundaries personalizes interpersonal, 
dynamic practices.39 If coming out after Eve Sedgwick et al. is no longer an unqualiﬁed 
good, then passing need no longer have a negative presumption against it from the 
beginning. Moral responsibility, Bok argues, requires being mindful of the processes 
of (self)-deception and how they are imputed, to whom, on what grounds, and with 
what power to bring about change.40 In our anxious effort to impute passing in the 
pejorative sense to others engaged in practices very like our own, we risk foreclosing 
on the transformative possibilities opened up by modernist border crossings. 
By way of returning to my point about identity as a wave rather than a territory, I 
end with a quotation from Virginia Woolf’s 1931 novel, The Waves.
I have passed. . . . What then remains, when I cannot pull out my papers and make you 
believe by reading aloud my credentials that I have passed? . . . I am merely “Neville” to 
you, who see the narrow limits of my life and the line it cannot pass. But to myself I am 
immeasurable, a net whose ﬁbres pass imperceptibly beneath the world.41
Notes
I presented a version of this essay at the Modernist Studies Association conference at Penn State 
in 1999. I have since presented versions of this material at the Ohio State University, the University of 
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405Notre Dame, DePauw University, and Loyola University Chicago. A different, and shorter, version will 
introduce the section “Modernism, Gender, and Passing” in Gender in Modernism: New Geographies; 
Complex Intersections, General Editor, Bonnie Kime Scott (forthcoming, University of Illinois Press). 
My thanks to all those who gave valuable comments, and to my generous friends and meticulous read-
ers, Anne Callahan, Janice Mouton, Bonnie Kime Scott, and Eleanor Skoller.
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